7.5: Unique Circumstances
Inferences Based on Circumstantial Evidence
As noted earlier, probable cause and reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts.” However, the courts will also consider an officer’s inferences as to the meaning or significance of the facts so long as the inference appeared to be reasonable. It is especially relevant that the inference was based on the officer’s training and experience. In the words of the Supreme Court, “The evidence must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.” Or, as the Court explained in United States v. Arvizu :
The process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.
For example, in People v. Soun, the defendant and three other men killed the owner of a video store in San Jose during a botched robbery. The men were all described as Asian, but witnesses provided conflicting descriptions of the getaway car. Some said it was a two-door Japanese car, but one said it was a Volvo “or that type of car.” Two of the witnesses provided a partial license plate number. One said he thought it began with 1RCS, possibly 1RCS525, or 1RCS583. The other said he thought it was 1RC(?)538.
A San Jose PD officer who was monitoring these developments at the station made two inferences:
(1) the actual license plate probably began with 1RCS, and (2) the last three numbers included a 5 and an 8. So he started running these combinations through DMV until he got a hit on 1RCS558, a 1981 Toyota registered in Oakland. Because the car was last seen heading toward Oakland, officers notified OPD and, the next day, OPD officers stopped the car and eventually arrested the occupants for the murder. This, in turn, resulted in the seizure of the murder weapon. On appeal, one of the occupants, Soun, argued that the weapon should have been suppressed because the detention was based on nothing more than “hunch and supposition.” On the contrary, said the court, what Soun labeled “hunch and supposition” was actually “intelligent and resourceful police work.”
Similarly, in People v. Carrington the California Supreme Court ruled that police in Los Altos reasonably inferred that two commercial burglaries were committed by the same person based on the following: “the two businesses were located in close proximity to each other, both businesses were burglarized on or about the same date, and in both burglaries, blank checks were stolen.”
Hunches and Unsupported Conclusions
It is well known that hunches play an important role in solving crimes. “A hunch,” said the Ninth Circuit, “may provide the basis for solid police work; it may trigger an investigation that uncovers facts that establish reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or even grounds for a conviction.” Still, hunches are absolutely irrelevant in determining the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. In other words, a hunch “is not a substitute for the necessary specific, articulable facts required to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion.”
The same is true of unsupported conclusions. For example, in ruling that a search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause, the court in U.S. v. Underwood noted that much of the affidavit was “made up of conclusory allegations” that were “entirely unsupported by facts.” Two of these allegations were that officers had made “other seizures” and had “intercepted conversations” that tended to prove the defendant was a drug trafficker. “[T]hese vague explanations,” said the court, “add little if any support because they do not include underlying facts.”
Information Known to Other Officers
Information is ordinarily irrelevant unless it had been communicated to the officer who acted on it; i.e., the officer who made the detention, arrest, or search, or the officer who applied for the search or arrest warrant. To put it another way, a search or seizure made without sufficient justification cannot be rehabilitated in court by showing that it would have been justified if the officer had been aware of information possessed by a colleague. As the California Supreme Court explained, “The question of the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct is determined on the basis of the information possessed by the officer at the time a decision to act is made.”
There is, however, an exception to this rule known as the “official channels rule” by which officers may detain, arrest, or sometimes search a suspect based solely on an official request to do so from another officer or agency. Under this rule, officers may also act based on information transmitted via a law enforcement database, such as NCIC and CLETS.
Although the officers who act upon such transmissions are seldom aware of many, if any, of the facts known to the originating officer, this does not matter because, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out, “[E]ffective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information.”
For example, in U.S. v. Lyons state troopers in Michigan stopped and searched the defendant’s car based on a tip from DEA agents that the driver might be transporting drugs. On appeal, Lyons argued that the search was unlawful because the troopers had no information as to why she was suspected of carrying drugs. But the court responded “it is immaterial that the troopers were unaware of all the specific facts that supported the DEA’s reasonable suspicion analysis. The troopers possessed all the information they needed to act—a request by the DEA (subsequently found to be well-supported).”
Note that, although officers “are entitled to presume the accuracy of information furnished to them by other law enforcement personnel,” 61 (Links to an external site.) the officers who disseminated the information may later be required to prove in court that they had received such information and that they reasonably believed it was reliable.
Information Inadmissible in Court
In determining whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists, officers may consider both hearsay and privileged communications. For example, although a victim’s identification of the perpetrator might constitute inadmissible hearsay or fall within the marital privilege, officers may rely on it unless they had reason to believe it was false. As the Court of Appeal observed, “The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that hearsay information will support the issuance of a search warrant.... Indeed, the usual search warrant, based on a reliable police informer’s or citizen informant's information, is necessarily founded upon hearsay.” On the other hand, information may not be considered if it was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of the suspect’s constitutional rights; e.g., an illegal search or seizure.
Mistakes of Fact and Law
If the probable cause was based on information that was subsequently determined to be inaccurate or false, the information may nevertheless be considered if the officers reasonably believed it was true. As the Court of Appeal put it, “If the officer’s belief is reasonable, it matters not that it turns out to be mistaken.” Or, in the words of the Supreme Court, “[W]hat is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”
The courts are not, however, so forgiving with mistakes of law. This is because officers are expected to know the laws they enforce and the laws that govern criminal investigations. Consequently, information will not be considered if it resulted from such a mistake, even if the mistake was made in good faith. As the California Supreme Court explained, “Courts on strong policy grounds have generally refused to excuse a police officer’s mistake of law.” Or, as the Ninth Circuit put it, “If an officer simply does not know the law and makes a stop based upon objective facts that cannot constitute a violation, his suspicions cannot be reasonable.”
To learn more about the fourth amendment and the requirement for probable cause, watch this video: the fourth amendment: the requirement for probable cause .
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