12.7: Key Supreme Court Cases on Plea Agreements
Facts of the Case
Missouri prosecutors offered Galin Edward Frye two deals while seeking his conviction for driving while his license was revoked, but his lawyer never told Frye about the offers. Frye pleaded guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to three years in prison. He appealed, saying his lawyer should have told him about the previous deals. A Missouri appeals court agreed. Prosecutors contend that not knowing about the deals they offered doesn't mean that Frye didn't know what he was doing when he decided to plead guilty.
Question
Can a defendant who validly pleads guilty assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging that, but for counsel's error in failing to communicate a plea offer, he would have pleaded guilty with more favorable terms?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to communicate formal plea offers from the prosecution. Justice Kennedy looked to Hill v. Lockhart and Padilla v. Kentucky ; in both cases, a prisoner claimed his guilty plea was invalid because counsel provided incorrect advice pertinent to the plea. While acknowledging that a defendant has no right to receive a plea offer, Justice Kennedy noted that the vast majority of both federal and state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. Justice Kennedy finally held that Frye must show a reasonable probability he would have accepted the initial plea and that neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that Frye was not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because the counsel's mistake did not deprive him of any substantive or procedural right. He further questioned the speculative nature of the majority's tests for effective counsel in plea bargaining.
Lafler v. Cooperlx
Facts of the Case
Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial, and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.
Question
Is a state habeas petitioner entitled to relief when his counsel deficiently advises him to reject a favorable plea bargain, but the defendant is later convicted and sentenced pursuant to a fair trial?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, vacating the Sixth Circuit judgment and returning the case for reconsideration. The Court held that the Michigan court applied the wrong standard when it rejected Cooper's claim to ineffective assistance of counsel. The proper test under Strickland v Washington is whether absent the ineffective counsel, a defendant would have accepted an offered plea that was less severe than his eventual sentence, and the trial court would have accepted the terms of that plea. The majority also held that the proper remedy is not specific performance of the original plea. On remand, the prosecution should re-offer the plea and, if the defendant accepts it, the trial court can decide how to amend the original sentence.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, stating that there is no right to habeas relief when counsel's advice caused a defendant to have a full and fair trial. A criminal defendant has no right to a plea bargain, so rejecting the plea did not deprive Cooper of any procedural right. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the Scalia dissent. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent except for Justice Scalia's assertions that the majority's decision elevates the plea bargain to a constitutional right. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate dissent criticizing the majority's "opaque discussion of the remedy...."