6.4: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
PETITIONER RESPONDENT
Merle R. Schneckloth Robert Clyde Bustamonte
LOCATION
Location of Car Search
DOCKET NO. DECIDED BY
71-732 Burger Court
LOWER COURT
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
CITATION
412 US 218 (1973)
ARGUED
Oct 10, 1972
DECIDED
May 29, 1973
GRANTED
Feb 28, 1972
ADVOCATES
Robert R. Granucci for petitioner
Stuart P. Tobisman for the respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court
Facts of the case
A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “ Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to th e search knew he had the right to refuse consent.
Question
- Did the court of appeals err when it held that the search of the car was invalid because the state failed to show consent given with knowledge that it could be withheld?
- Should claims relating to search and seizure be available to a prisoner filing a writ of habeus corpus?
Conclusion
6–3 Decision for Schneckloth Majority Opinion by Potter Stewart
| FOR | AGAINST |
|---|---|
|
Stewart White Powell Burger Blackmun Rehnquist |
Douglas Brennan Marshall |
Yes, No answer. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6 -3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that whether consent is voluntary can be determined from the totality of the circumstances. It is unnecessary to prove that the person who gave consent knew that h e had the right to refuse. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Because the Fourth Amendment claims had no merit, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the main question should be whether Bustamonte had a fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claims. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, agreeing with the majority and noting it was unnecessary to reach the issue discussed by Justice Powell.